Is Donald Trump finally turning on Vladimir Putin?

I hope so, but I have nagging questions.

For months, President Donald Trump has heaped scorn on Ukraine while expressing faith in Russian President Vladimir Putin’s desire for peace. Even when he started publicly doubting Putin’s intentions in mid-July, he said he would wait 50 days before imposing additional consequences on Russia and its enablers. Russia used this time to launch some of its deadliest attacks on Ukrainian cities since the war began.

This week, Trump signaled consequences might at last be coming. He imposed a new 25% tariff on India, after accusing it of buying “massive amounts of Russian Oil,” of “selling [the oil] on the open market for big profits,” and of not caring “how many people in Ukraine are being killed by this Russian war machine.”

India has indeed been buying Russian oil, under an arrangement the United States and our European allies have accepted for some time. The idea was to let Russia sell some of its oil to keep global gas prices from spiking while setting a below-market cap (initially $60 a barrel) on what countries could pay for it, so that Russia would make less money. But Russia still profits enough to keep its murderous war machine going, and more must be done to limit its main source of revenue.

I agree with Trump that the time has come to squeeze Russian oil sales further. This is a rare occasion when I’m actually rooting for him to execute a policy competently.

Unfortunately today, one day after announcing the pressure campaign against Russia’s enablers, we learned Trump is angling for a one-on-one summit meeting with Putin, which could come as early as next week. Pro-Putin commentators are spinning this as a triumph for the Russian leader.

So, I have some nagging questions.

Why is Trump only threatening India?

It makes no sense to pressure only a close U.S. partner like India for buying Russian oil when China purchases as much or more. China also provides direct material support to the Russian military. And Trump is appeasing China on multiple fronts: He keeps postponing threatened tariff increases; he’s lifted curbs on chip exports; he even blocked the president of Taiwan from visiting New York last week to avoid angering Beijing. Is the Trump administration really ready to wage economic war on China over Ukraine? I don’t think Chinese leader Xi Jinping believes he has much to worry about here.

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates also buy a huge amount of cut-rate Russian fuel oil, which they use to generate electricity for their domestic markets. This allows them to sell even more of their own oil to us at a profit—basically the same thing Trump is criticizing India for. Will he come down as hard on the Saudi crown prince and his other buddies in the Persian Gulf—the same ones pumping cash into companies his family owns and promising him massive investment in the U.S. economy? I’ll bet you 100 $Trump coins that he will not.

Why are tariffs his only stick?

We all know Trump is obsessed with tariffs. That’s why the bipartisan Russia sanctions bill that pro-Ukraine members of Congress have been pushing threatens up to 500% tariffs on countries buying Russian oil. Like everyone on the planet trying to influence the Mad King, they are trying to speak his language.

The problem with imposing 500% (or even 100% or 50%) tariffs on a country is that it would basically end trade with that country, hurting the U.S. economy as much the one we’re trying to target. Again, is the administration going to play that game of chicken with China (or any other big economy) and sustain it over months, especially when it’s trying to negotiate a trade deal to end its confrontation with Beijing and to calm global markets? This threat is not credible.

What happened to helping Ukraine fight?

The best way to convince Putin that he can’t win the war remains an all out all of NATO effort to equip Ukraine to defeat Russia’s air and land attacks. Here, Trump is doing less terribly than a few months ago. He’s resumed delivery of some weapons that were approved and paid for under the Biden administration. But he’s also made clear the United States will not spend another penny to continue this support; it will only sell weapons to European NATO allies, which will then pass those weapons to Ukraine.

OK, so what should be done?

Achieving the goals the Trump administration says it now embraces will require doing several hard things at the same time (in addition to better arming Ukraine).

First, we do need to persuade India and China—as well as Turkey, the Gulf States, and others—to buy less Russian oil and gas while working to lower the price cap for whatever is still sold. This will require a lot of old-fashioned diplomacy and sticks more credible than the mutually assured economic destruction of tariffs (for example, sanctions against the companies and banks these countries use to conduct their oil trade with Russia). At the same time, we should join the Europeans in tightening sanctions against the so-called “shadow fleet” of oil tankers Russia uses to get around the price caps.

Second, Trump must convince—or compel—Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to increase their oil production to compensate for the Russian oil that will not be flowing to global markets (which they can do). Otherwise, gas prices for Americans will rise, and I don’t believe for a second Trump will stick to any “tough on Russia” policy if that is the cost. Nor will China, India, or any of Russia’s current energy customers, no matter what we threaten them with.

Third, Trump will need to keep up the pressure until Russia actually stops attacking Ukraine. He can’t let Putin buy him off with offers of a nice meeting, or some partial “air” cease fire that stops Ukrainian deep strikes into Russia while allowing Russia’s land invasion to grind on.

Why am I skeptical?

In a normal administration, the president and his senior team set broad policy goals. Then experienced experts at the State, Defense, and Treasury Departments ask the kinds of questions I’m posing here, think through potential pitfalls, and develop a strategy that can overcome them.

But in this Trump-Hegseth-Gabbard-Patel administration, the political leadership is largely incompetent; the career professionals, if they haven’t been fired, are cowed and rarely consulted; the president believes he can bend the world to his will with a tweet and that Putin respects him, and no one is allowed to tell him otherwise.

Can such an administration implement a complicated, multistage plan to turn global energy markets against Russia without hurting the U.S. economy and sustain it long enough to change the course of the war in Ukraine? Or will Trump find an offramp in the next vaguely enticing but empty offer Putin makes?

Given the stakes in Ukraine, I truly hope he can pull it off. But we should all be prepared for disappointment.

Tom Malinowski is a former member of Congress from New Jersey who was an assistant secretary of state in the Obama administration.

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