The war on Iran is not isolated to Iran. When the bombing began, violence instantly broke through borders and restless nations capitalized on the volatility. From the Gulf States to the stateless Kurds, conflict is spreading and destabilizing the entire region.
Who is impacted and what is at stake? Suzanne Maloney, Vice President and Director of the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, breaks it down for us in her insightful conversation with Jen. The two tackle the U.S.’s inability to secure a “regime changed” Iran, lessons learned from the fall of communism, and the Gulf States’s mounting frustration. Maloney also touches on Israel and its attacks on Lebanon, Russia’s growing relationship with Iran, and the Kurds’s watching from the wings…for now.
Suzanne Maloney is the vice president and director of the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution. Maloney counseled both Democratic and Republican administrations on Iran. She previously served as ExxonMobil Corporation’s Middle East advisor for ExxonMobil Corporation.
The following transcript has been edited for formatting purposes.
Jen Rubin
Hi, this is Jen Rubin, Editor-in-Chief of The Contrarian. I am so happy to bring you Suzanne Maloney, who is the Vice President and Director of the Foreign Policy Program at Brookings. She’s advised Republicans and Democrats, and she is the author of multiple books on the Middle East. Welcome, Suzanne!
Suzanne Maloney
Thanks so much for having me.
Jen Rubin
Well, today we get word that, a Pentagon investigation has at least in the interim, determined that the Tomahawk missiles, that struck the school were not only the U.S, but it was a result of a targeting error. The president has tried to deny responsibility. At this stage, it’s too early to see where the responsibility lies, but if you were in an administration, what would be the normal course of an investigation like this, and what should the president be saying or not saying?
Suzanne Maloney
Well, I think the normal course of an investigation would be… would involve, staff that investigates civilian casualties in the Pentagon, and what we’ve learned is that some of those staff have been let go, that that office has been drawn down, as a result of a shift in priorities under the current administration. This is, you know, a fact of war, that accidents do happen, that there are targets that are missed, or civilians that are inadvertently hit, and it is, you know, part and parcel of the U.S. way of war that we take that seriously, that we do, in fact, try to get to the bottom when mistakes are made, and that we do, in fact, find opportunities to both express remorse and offer compensation. That’s particularly awkward in this case, because the president has sought To, deny responsibility in various interviews. And it doesn’t seem as though there’s going to be a lot forthcoming, but I have noted that members of Congress have acknowledged that it does appear that this was a U.S. strike that killed more than 150 young girls and their teachers and family members at a school that happened to be near a military base, but not, in fact, part of any offensive military capability on the part of the Iranians.
Jen Rubin
It’s one of many examples of why the decision to go to war is so fraught, so serious, and should only be undertaken as a last resort. And that does bring us to why we are in this conflict. Do you know… Can you tell if the administration has settled on one explanation or another? Because obviously, what you intend to accomplish determines how long it’s going to go on, and when you say enough.
Suzanne Maloney
No, I think that there has been a fundamental incoherence in the justification and purported objectives for this conflict expressed by various officials, including President Trump himself. And even, you know, how we got here in the aftermath of the worst case of violent repression by the Islamic Republic, that the president seemed to insert himself in via social media, promising to rescue Iranians. He did nothing of the kind. There was no possibility for U.S, the U.S. to undertake that kind of a mission, as the Iranians were coming to the streets in early January. But in fact, in the aftermath, there was this mobilization of force, a fairly rushed and seemingly also incoherent attempt at diplomacy, and then the decision to strike. And not just to strike, but of course, the president, in his initial remarks that were released with the news of the beginning of the war, really did give a sense that this was a mission with very ambitious objectives, to change the regime, to give Iranians the opportunity to seize their own state. That was ludicrous at the start. It’s a very well-armed and very well-entrenched regime. And of course, we’ve seen the backpedaling and shifting explanations of other senior members of the administration, suggesting, you know, reasonably, that the mission is intended to take out Iran’s naval capabilities. It’s ballistic missile program, and launchers, and as well as other offensive and defensive military capabilities on the part of the Iranians. But the president and other officials and, of course our partners in this operation, the Israelis, continue to give a variety of explanations, and I think that that makes this confusing to the American people, confusing to our partners and allies in the and around the world.
Jen Rubin
Explain to our audience what regime change in a country like Iran, 90 million people entails. The current regime has been in power for 47 years. It’s not simply a thin strata of mullahs at the top. What would this entail, and is there any sign that the entire structure of the regime is about to crumble?
Suzanne Maloney
Look, my colleague Phil Gordon has written an excellent book on the very ignominious history of U.S. efforts at regime change, especially in the Middle East. We haven’t really seen Significant accomplishments that leave a more positive future for the people of the region, particularly when we seek to impose regime change through military activity. I think in this case, you know, there is a deep dissatisfaction among many Iranians with the system of government that’s been in place since the 1979 revolution. It has not provided a better future for Iranians, or economic opportunities, or, you know, any sense of, you know, a real democracy, which is what Iranians fought for when they came to the streets 47 years ago. But, you know, in fact, for us to try to go in and change the regime itself is… would be exceptionally difficult, because this has been a system, because it came to power through a popular revolution, has spent the subsequent decades seeking to ensure that nothing like that can ever happen again in Iran, and so while there’s a lot of unhappiness, the system itself has an enormous amount of redundancy, heavily institutionalized a very, immense and powerful security bureaucracy, which has become quite adept at undercutting any efforts to mobilize in an organized and consistent way among all those who would like to see some sort of better future. And so, over time, sure, there’s a lot that we could do that might actually aid the cause of Iranians to bring about a different kind of government. A lot of that work would have been funded or supported and assisted by organizations like the U.S. Agency for International Development, which, of course, the Trump administration disbanded. And so, we’re not well positioned to help in the traditional and hopefully long-term effective ways that we might have been, and there really is no prospect of simply removing the regime through military action. The only possible outcome, and I think this would be, in fact, quite worse for the Iranians. people would be, you know, something that, if we were to sustain this campaign over weeks and months, something that looks like state collapse, and, you know, that could be… create a real turmoil in the heart of the Middle East with implications for our partners and allies and for the global economy.
Jen Rubin
There was some reporting, some suggestion, whether it was sincere or not, that the Kurds might be mounting some kind of action in the region. The Kurds, of course, are group that spans, multiple, nation borders, has been aggrieved by nations in the area. It does not appear that that is taking place. We’ve been sympathetic to the Kurds, but is that a realistic tactic, to have the Kurds, try to disrupt the Iranian regime? And what would our partners, for example, in Turkey have to say about that?
Suzanne Maloney
No, I think that would be an incredibly ill-conceived notion. I, you know, I wasn’t surprised to hear it, and to see it in the press, and I would not be surprised if either some in the Pentagon, or if the Israelis see this as a possible avenue, perhaps not for actually creating regime change, but again, for finding ways to weaken the Islamic Republic. I think it would set our cause back, it would set the, you know, the hope of Iranians for a better future back substantially, because, you know, although Iran is very much a multi-ethnic society, that is, you know, true of Iran for time immemorial, and the sense of Iranian nationalism is quite powerful, even with this regime. If it appeared that the United States was trying to promote armed ethnic separatists. that would have, I think, very negative consequences within the kind of pro-democracy movement within Iran. I think it would also rebound quite negatively for some of the other states of the region, particularly Iraq, Syria, and of course, Turkey, and I think that none of the central governments in those countries would look kindly upon yet another effort to try to use the Kurds as a wedge against a potential adversary. The Kurds have lost out time and time again because of these tactics by the United States, and it would be very unfortunate if we tried to utilize them again.
Jen Rubin
One of the, great successes of the United States and our entire Western alliance, of course, was the fall of communism. And that took decades over, you know, multiple continents, and we did not bring down the Soviet Union and its satellite powers by force. It was a concerted effort through containment, through economic pressure, through support for dissidents. Is that a feasible framework, for how we deal with Iran and other regimes?
Suzanne Maloney
I think there’s a lot that we can adapt from that framework to deal with the Islamic Republic, and frankly, it has informed the strategy of activists around the world who have sought to try to ensure that Iranians have access to information, that, in fact, you know, we’re creating support mechanisms for student movements, for trade unions, all of those, you know, ideas are very much borrowed from the fight against communism. The Islamic Republic, of course, has taken notice of, you know, the fall of communism. It was a catalytic moment for the regime itself, and so You know, I think that they have also sought to insulate themselves against those same tactics, but realistically, you know, especially in this time, Iranians understand they’re well, very highly educated and very well informed about the world around them. They have a diaspora that is incredibly educated and influential in a variety of places, including the United States. Iran was… had an economy on par with South Korea and Turkey in the 1960s, even before the oil boom. Had some of the largest petroleum resources in the world, but even more human and natural resources. be a country poised to do amazing things. But this government is… you know, we shouldn’t mistake the staying power of this government. It will be heavily weakened, because it will have lost most of its military arsenal, but its ability to repress its own people, its ability to sort of clamp down and become a sort of North Korea-like state, shouldn’t be disregarded.
Jen Rubin
The countries in the region, our Arab partners, have come under quite a bit of fire. According to news reports, this surprises the president. I suspect it doesn’t surprise you or many of your colleagues. The notion that we wouldn’t be prepared for this is somewhat mind-boggling. How does that change the relationship of those states with the United States and with Israel? Are they going to be less willing to be cooperative with us? Are they going to become closer to us because of the fire that they’ve taken from Iran? How do you see those relationships shaking out?
Suzanne Maloney
The Gulf states are in a really difficult position. They had, over the past few years, sought to co-opt the Iranians, in part because of their lack of, you know, sort of confidence in a U.S. administration that had appeared to fail to react in 2019, for example, when Iranian-backed militias targeted the most important processing facilities for Saudi oil exports, and knocked about 5% of world oil off the market for a series of weeks. The failure of the Trump administration then to come to the aid of a long-standing partner whose involvement in the world economy is very much critical to the global economy. That, I think, sent the Saudis into a different set of approaches to Iran. They really have, over the subsequent years. sought to build a different relationship, one that really kept Iran at bay. But of course, now they’ve been targeted, so have the Emirates, which has a very long and deep economic relationship with Iran. The Qataris, who share a gas reservoir with the Iranians, they’re feeling that their own political, economic, strategic projects are very much vulnerable to Iranian and reprisals. They also have, I think, a sense of frustration with the United States, which launched this war without consulting heavily with its Gulf partners, and, you know, really left them in the firing zone.
Jen Rubin
that both states have had, in some cases, a warm peace, in other cases, a cold peace with Israel. And they have moved closer, arguably. The sole achievement of, Trump 1 was the Abraham Accords. That was premised on the notion that Israel was a strong, reliable partner, they would be safer in a relationship with Israel. Now that Israel has acted as it is, and is continuing to, continue its battle in Lebanon and so on, are those states, less, perhaps eager to ally themselves with Israel? Do they like, Israel as, Flexing its muscles and seeking to become the dominant power in the region.
Suzanne Maloney
The Emiratis have an excellent, deep, and very friendly relationship with the Israelis that was built through and has continued to grow since the establishment of the Abraham Accords. But I think even there, there’s a feeling of strain, and there’s a feeling of anxiety about the Israeli tactics, because I, you know, there’s just the way that Israelis view the world today in the aftermath of October 7th. I’ve heard said from well-placed Israelis that it’s really, you know, there’s a… it’s often personalized to Prime Minister Netanyahu, but that there is a wide consensus among the Israeli strategic community that there needs to be aggressive action against any entity that could pose a threat to the state of Israel, and that they’re prepared to do whatever may be necessary to ensure that there can be no such threat ever again. And that’s an understandable reaction to the trauma of October 7th. But I think it creates a different set of realities for Israeli security policy in the region than some of their partners, such as the Emiratis, and certainly even their closest allies, such as the United States, might agree with. And I think, you know, one of those tactics will be a consistent Israeli effort. Even when and however this war in Iran ends, they will continue to try to seek to destabilize Iran. They will continue to try to seek to ensure that Iran is consumed by its own difficulties at home, rather than able to pose any kind of threat to Israel directly again.
Jen Rubin
Israel is launching a, enormous offensive in Lebanon, in Beirut and Beirut and the southern suburbs. There’s really been, huge decimation, 700,000 people or so displaced. What are their goals there? And, will they, do you think, be able to reach some kind of, stabilization so that they don’t, either feel the need to continually attack and they don’t, in turn, face incoming fire from Hezbollah on a regular basis, which has been the case over the last years or so.
Suzanne Maloney
Well, you know, the Israelis scored some significant victories in terms of taking out the top echelon of Hezbollah leadership more than a year ago, and that has, I think, compounded over time Hezbollah’s weakness. It’s largely been underground. What we saw as this war erupted was Hezbollah come out and very much, you know, hedge its bets initially, and then decide to get into the war, which is one of my colleagues, Ambassador Jeff Feltman, who was U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon during the 2006 war, has described as effectively a suicide mission for Hezbollah. I listened to both Jeff and my colleague Mara Carlin, who has held senior positions at the Pentagon and has had a lot of background working specifically around Lebanon. And I think that they would… I’ve heard them say that there, you know, there’s an opportunity right now. The Lebanese state is stepping up to the plate. They have suggested that they’re prepared to outlaw Hezbollah and to… and that there is going to be much greater cooperation on ensuring the full-fledged disarmament of the militia. The Israelis are, at the moment, at least trying to achieve that through force. I think that, you know, they will miss an opportunity if they don’t actually take this moment to strengthen the central government, to give that central government, Lebanon, the opportunity to play a direct role in ensuring that Hezbollah cannot somehow mount a comeback, as we’ve seen in previous eras.
Jen Rubin
Russia has had an interesting relationship in this conflict. On one hand, they appear to be helping the Iranians target, American, assets, if we believe the reporting. They have also benefited from higher crude oil prices. And of course, there’s been a diversion of, American attention, American munitions from Ukraine to Iran, and yet. they haven’t really been the great allies that they’re cooked up to be. After all, Syria didn’t survive because of the Russians. The Russians are not the greatest partners in the world. How did they come out on balance from a conflict like this?
Suzanne Maloney
Well, I think for the Russians, this is, Christmas Day, you know? It’s a great opportunity for them to strengthen the relationship when… with Tehran. Tehran will be more reliant on the Russians. Now we’re seeing the outflow of Iranian drones from Russia, or Iranian-conceived drones from Russia, to Tehran. The prospect that the United States is going to be bogged down in another and appear to be incapable of even taming a power as modest as the Iranians, is a net positive for the Russians. And of course, there’s a large economic windfall that they’ll receive, both as a result of higher oil prices, but also because of the Iranian attacks that have led to the shut-in of some gas production from Qatar And that’s been a crucial source of alternative supply for Europe since the, since the outbreak of the war in… or since the full-fledged invasion of Ukraine by Russia. And if there isn’t Qatari gas, it may be necessary for the Europeans once again to consider importing Russian natural gas.
Jen Rubin
At some point, the war will end, and we’ll be left with, a very bruised and battered Iran, more determined, perhaps, than ever to, insulate the regime. Gaza will remain, a… at a standstill and a human, really catastrophic, status. what comes at the very end of this? Are we not faced with the same kind of intractable issues that have to be addressed by diplomacy, by economic investment, and the rest? One wonders at the end of the day whether we’re kind of back where we started from.
Suzanne Maloney
We are back where we started from, but potentially in an even more dangerous place. The Islamic Republic will likely remain. It will be battered and bloodied, and looking to wreak havoc both on its own population, as well as on those that it blames for the… for the under… for this war. But it will… it may also have access to the highly enriched uranium, that was produced before for the June war that is now, stored underground. It may be dispersed in some cases around the country. It’s enough, highly enriched uranium for about 9 to 10 nuclear bombs. They would… they would have to enrich it to a higher grade for true bomb level, but they could have, dirty bombs. as a result of if they’re actually able to access this material, and they will have every incentive to do so, because they’ve now been attacked twice, and they can look at the example of North Korea and recognize that the decision to stay a latent nuclear state, rather than a full-fledged declared nuclear power, exposed them to greater vulnerability, and this is a hardline, recalcitant leadership the new Supreme Leader, who is the son of the individual who was killed on the first day of the war, lost his father, his mother, his wife, and a number of other members of his family. He was already predisposed to be very hostile to the United States. It seems likely that he will not… should he actually be able to assume her, and we haven’t seen him in public, so it is a bit of a mystery at the moment about his condition, since he was likely wounded in those attacks as well. But, you know, there’s almost no constellation of leaders who are going to be in charge in Iran for the foreseeable future, who won’t be determined to try to both ensure that they have the ability to deter future attacks, including through a nuclear weapon if necessary, and also determined to repress their own population at a much higher and more nefarious level than ever.
Jen Rubin
Let me end with a governance issue. Presidents of both parties have accumulated more and more authority in war making, and although presidents have undertaken military action without congressional consent, this is the largest commitment, a full-fledged war without involvement of Congress. First of all, is that a… condition that you think needs to be addressed? And if it is, how do we go about reestablishing a balance so presidents aren’t loose cannons, free to start wars around the globe on whims and misinformation and personal grudges and the rest?
Suzanne Maloney
Well, look, we have the tools to ensure that there is a proper consideration of decisions as important as war and peace, and that really is the War Powers Act and the role of the Congress. The challenge right now is that, you know, within Congress, there doesn’t seem to be a will. to impose their own role and authority on the expansive ambitions of this president, and I think that’s an incredibly dangerous condition. We’ve never seen a war of this nature launched without at least some cursory explanation to the American people as to why that we… the President feels that it’s necessary to undertake this mission. And, I, you know, particularly as Americans are going to see the consequences of this war on their pocketbooks and at gas pumps for the weeks and months to come, I think that dereliction of duty by both the executive branch, but also by the Congress is going to loom large as we approach the midterms.
Jen Rubin
Well, it almost makes you long for the days of 2003, when at least George Bush did go for an authorization for the use of force, and we had a full-fledged debate. based upon faulty, assumptions, but nevertheless, we had that debate. Suzanne, thank you so much, for your insights. Obviously, however the war ends, there’s gonna be… continue to be a fraught region, and we so appreciate your taking the time. So we’ll look forward to checking back in with you in the near future.
Suzanne Maloney
Thanks so much.
